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RESUMÉ 
Det overordnede tema for denne artikel er en filosofisk evaluering af 
lykkeforskningens mest dominerende tilgang til lykke, nemlig 
livstilfredsstillelsesteorien. I praksis udføres evalueringen ved en behandling 
af Christian Bjørnskovs bidrag om lykke til den populære danske serie for 
videnskabelig formidling Tænkepauser, hvori han indtager netop en sådan 
teoretisk position. Jeg konkluderer at der er både metodologiske og filosofisk-
konceptuelle problemer ved tilgangen til lykke som livstilfredsstillelse, hvis 
fordele som en empirisk videnskab må måles og vejes i henhold til disse 
problemer. Endelig fremlægger jeg også hvordan en mulig revision af 
positionen kunne se ud uden at skulle ofre dens videnskabelige integritet.  
 
ABSTRACT 
The overall theme of this article is a philosophical evaluation of happiness 
research and its most dominant approach to happiness, life satisfaction theory. 
In practice, the evaluation is carried out in a review of Christian Bjørnskov’s 
pocketbook on happiness in the Danish series for popular science Tænkepauser, 
wherein he embraces exactly such a position. I conclude that there are both 
methodological and philosophical-conceptual problems with the approach to 
happiness as life satisfaction. Finally, I also present a possible revision of what 
the position could look like without sacrificing its scientific integrity.     
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Introduction 
The question of happiness is among the most decisive issues for our way of 
living. How we answer this question will reflect how we live our lives. It is, 
therefore, of crucial importance that we are able to reason critically about any 
attempts to answer this question.  
One such attempt is so-called happiness research. A growing academic 
industry, it has achieved influence both in the theoretical world of academia as 
well as the practical sphere of socio-political decision-making. Most 
importantly, however, it is influencing the public. In 2014, for instance, the 
popular series for disseminating scientific research in Denmark, Tænkepauser, 
published a pocketbook on happiness written by a happiness researcher solely 
from the point of view of this field. This book is now available in various shops 
around the country. In it, the author, Christian Bjørnskov, sets out to present 
what science can teach us about happiness (Bjørnskov 2014, 9). And that is no 
small thing – for, according to the book description, Bjørnskov has discovered 
what happiness is. The book provides us with plentiful of correlations between 
empirical measurements of happiness and other variables such as wealth, love, 
etc., enabling its author to assess what makes us happy and refute some 
common myths (ibid., 23).  
What the author does not tell us, however, is that the conceptual framework of 
his book has been an object of immense critique not only from philosophers but 
other happiness researchers as well. For the layman for whom such resources 
are scarcely available and probably too time-consuming to read, just 
identifying the definition of happiness invoked in the book may seem like a 
difficult task – especially because the author nowhere makes the definition 
explicit. There is, therefore, a need for a review of the book in which Bjørnskov’s 
approach is clarified and evaluated philosophically and in a language 
understandable to everyone. I regard this paper as such a review. Its object is 
to highlight some objections against the approach of the pocketbook in order 
to conclude in plain and simple terms what the layman reader ought to be 
aware of about the book and happiness research in general.  
First, I shall clarify the conceptual approach of the book and its definition of 
happiness, which, as I said, is not a straightforward task. Next, I shall raise 
some standard objections against the approach and discuss how it could be 
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defended. As a part of this, I shall also propose some constructive future 
directions.  
Happiness according to happiness research  
Most of Bjørnskov’s book is an exposition of empirical correlations between 
happiness measurements and different variables without revealing which 
particular measurements and theoretical approaches are in question. This can 
serve as a rhetorical tool to make the approach sound more intuitive and 
conventional while, in fact, that is anything but the case. Consequently, we find 
the author claiming that happiness research has no definition of happiness at 
all and that it merely measures whatever people put into the term (ibid., 17). 
However, well aware that this is not the case (for good reasons), Bjørnskov is 
forced to reveal that the surveys he is considering, such as the ones conducted 
by the Eurobarometer, are based on an approach to happiness as “the 
satisfaction with one’s life as a whole” (ibid.). This means that, in practice, the 
respondents are posed the question “how satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole” and are given a scale with which to rate their evaluations.1 The resulting 
figure represents that particular respondent’s level of happiness or, more 
precisely, his or her “subjective well-being” (ibid., 12).  
The life satisfaction theory of happiness, which Bjørnskov embraces, is the 
dominant approach in happiness research at present (Vittersø 2013, 230); and, 
in this sense, Bjørnskov’s presentation is, indeed, conventional. Sometimes, the 
life satisfaction theory is combined with a hedonist account by taking into 
consideration the balance between positive and negative affects (Diener & 
Pavot 2013), but Bjørnskov is very keen to exclude any hedonic component in 
his definition. This is because, as he claims, happiness researchers are 
interested in the happiness we feel over a long period of time and between the 
affective ups and downs in our everyday lives – or, in other words, our long-
term happiness (Bjørnskov 2014, 12). To give a practical example, a drug addict 
might very well feel plenty of positive affects in the moment, but this does not 
mean he is satisfied with his life as a whole.  
                                                 
1 According to the OECD’s guidelines to happiness measurements, the most common scale 
for measuring life satisfaction is the so-called ”satisfaction with life scale” (OECD, 2013, p. 
167). 
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In life satisfaction theory, therefore, this aspect of wholeness is known as the 
“global” (Haybron 2011, 8) or “comprehensive” (Crisp 2008, 14) approach to 
satisfaction vis-à-vis the satisfaction with specific domains in life such as career, 
family, etc. This approach to life satisfaction has the advantage that it is easier 
to justify on intuitive grounds why being satisfied with one’s life is more 
important than being satisfied with particular domains within that life.     
Philosophically speaking, however, the life satisfaction theory and the hedonic 
theory, which Bjørnskov rejects, are not that different. Both belong to a group 
of so-called subjectivist theories of happiness. This means that they ground 
happiness in the individual’s subjective experience and state of mind. For 
Bjørnskov, this state is life satisfaction; whereas, for the hedonist, it is positive 
affects. In both cases, however, only I can say whether I am happy or not. The 
difference between hedonism and life satisfaction lies merely in which 
experience counts as contributing to happiness. In contrast to both of them, 
objectivist theories of happiness, such as Aristotle’s, assert that happiness is 
independent of whether we experience it as such. Happiness is not something 
we feel, it is something we are. Cultivating certain virtues or acquiring God’s 
blessing count as happiness independent of whether we experience them as 
such or no (although this should not exclude the experience of joy and 
satisfaction). In the following, I shall deal with some of the common objections 
made against life satisfaction theory and apply them to Bjørnskov’s book. A 
short summary is given in the conclusion.          
A philosophical evaluation of life satisfaction theory            
Although criticism of life satisfaction theory is quite recent, there have been a 
number of substantial objections made against this type of theory in previous 
philosophical literature. Some question the possibility of measuring 
satisfaction with life as a whole (methodological objections) while others turn 
against the very definition of happiness as life satisfaction (philosophical 
objections). The one I will begin with here is a version of a classical 
philosophical critique made by Derek Parfit (1984, 494–99). In other words, 
what I am asking is whether a life satisfaction theory of happiness holds as a 
theory of happiness.  
Parfit’s critique is concerned with the relationship between evaluating one’s 
satisfaction with life and being sufficiently informed about the factual 
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circumstances of that life. A respondent may very well decide that he or she is 
highly satisfied with his or her life while being falsely informed about its actual 
circumstances. Consequently, a respondent may feel satisfied because she is 
convinced that she is married to a good husband and living a healthy family 
life; whereas, in reality, that is anything but true. Take, for instance, the case of 
Barbara Kuklinski. Her husband, Richard Kuklinski (also known as the 
Iceman), lived a double life as a contract killer, claiming to have killed over 100 
people while he lived a normal family life with Barbara and their children for 
almost 40 years. He brought home immense material wealth from his second 
life, ensuring that his family lived without material shortage. Barbara would 
most probably have scored a high number on a happiness measurement during 
this period of her life. But is this really a happy life? 
At this point, it is important to highlight that, by “really”, we do not mean that 
Barbara’s delusion is objectionable on a moral basis and that she is not “really” 
happy because to be deluded is morally bad. This would easily be trumped by 
Bjørnskov with the argument that, as an empirical science, happiness research 
cannot conclude whether living in delusion is good or bad, morally speaking, 
but only assert whether people actually feel or do not feel satisfaction. It is a 
classical assertion within the philosophy of science that moral beliefs cannot be 
verified empirically. There is no material object out there that proves being 
deluded is absolutely bad. Unlike a plant, which we can see is green, moral 
observations are always grounded in some normative assumptions. It is also 
due to this background that the subjectivist theories of happiness are preferable 
in a scientific context because they refer the least to a moral fabric (Moore 2013, 
22). Instead of claiming an objective account of happiness, we merely ask the 
respondent how he or she feels – satisfied or dissatisfied. It is, therefore, also 
necessary to know that happiness research cannot take into account whether 
the way people live their lives is morally justifiable. A subject might be a rapist 
and a war criminal and still be perfected satisfied with his life.  
Although this is an obvious issue for happiness research, it is not the line of 
argument I wish to follow here. Rather, I wish to show that, even if we accept 
this scientific premise and stay at the level of subjective experience, “delusion” 
still poses a serious issue to happiness research. This is so for the following 
reason: had Barbara been better informed about her life, it would have affected 
her subjective experience of life satisfaction significantly. Likewise, as soon as 
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she is exposed to the factual circumstances of her life, it will affect her life 
satisfaction significantly. So “delusion” remains an issue to be dealt with even 
at the level of subjective experience due to its tacit threat. Life satisfaction 
theory remains dubious.   
The problem becomes even more urgent for happiness research when one takes 
into consideration that, in principle, there is nothing to prevent this from being 
the case with a whole population. The Japanese government spread 
propaganda during the Second World War that it was winning the war against 
the Allies, which might have been a factor in causing more satisfaction among 
its inhabitants. Had they known the truth, they would have been less satisfied.  
According to the above objection, information about one’s circumstances is 
casually related with one’s experience of life satisfaction. Now, one can either 
feel too much life satisfaction compared to the factual circumstances – as, for 
instance, Barbara did -- or the opposite might also be true; one can be too little 
satisfied due to false information. I can, for instance, be dissatisfied with my 
life because I falsely believe my husband is a contract killer; whereas, in reality, 
he is even more honest than the average. In short, what the argument serves to 
show is that information has an effect on life satisfaction. Life satisfaction 
theory, therefore, seems to be an inadequate theory of happiness. We are 
looking for what some happiness researchers call “authentic” happiness, i.e., 
happiness that is well informed and grounded in reality (Seligman 2011, 11). 
Nevertheless, inauthentic happiness is exactly what (in principle) might just be 
the case with those populations we call “the happiest in the world”.  
There is a particular reply available to the happiness researcher that is not 
available to life satisfaction theorists in general. For this reason, it is not 
considered by Parfit and only rarely brought up in philosophical discussions.2 
The happiness researcher might counter-argue that, despite its many 
philosophical deficiencies, we still need a scientific way to measure happiness, 
and the life satisfaction approach outruns all its rivals in terms of scientific 
integrity. There are two claims in this argument, which are in need of 
justification: (1) that we “still need a scientific way to measure happiness” and 
(2) that “the life satisfaction approach outruns all its rivals in terms of scientific 
                                                 
2 One place it is brought up, however, is Kappel 1996, pp. 76–96.  
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integrity”. Since they are by no means given as true, it would be profitable to 
conduct a thorough inquiry into both of these claims.  
(1) The incentives to measure happiness empirically are actually quite plentiful. 
It could, for instance, help institutions decide which subjects are most in need 
of medical or economic resources by comparing their subjective well-being. 
Furthermore, happiness measurements have already proven successful in 
providing unprecedented indicators in socio-political decision-making. Most 
strikingly, it has been demonstrated that levels of happiness are uncorrelated 
with GDP (OECD 2013, 37). For instance, it was perceived in retrospect that, 
although both Egypt and Tunisia experienced economic growth in the years 
leading up to the Arab Spring of 2011, both countries showed a significant 
decline in measurements on happiness (ibid.). This provides decision-makers 
with alternative indicators of well-being. Nevertheless, it does not mean that 
happiness measurements can call themselves measurements of happiness 
unconditionally. If we can prove that happiness measurements simply do not 
measure what they promise but something else, then it would be a misuse of 
the term “happiness”. 
And, as a matter of fact, such objections have been made both theoretically and 
empirically. Some researchers (Vittersø 2013, 233) question the very possibility 
of measuring life satisfaction. They ask whether respondents are really capable 
of providing an evaluation of their life satisfaction in a questionnaire. Given 
both the mind’s limited capacity for information processing and our dynamic 
aspirations in life, it is most unlikely that respondents can articulate a finite set 
of personal goals in a survey and then evaluate which of them have been 
realized in order to give a final numerical evaluation of his or her satisfaction 
(ibid., 234). This problem is even more urgent when one takes into 
consideration that empirical observations of survey responses showed that it 
only took respondents a couple of seconds to answer questions about life 
satisfaction, which is hardly sufficient to evaluate one’s life as a whole (ibid.). 
Instead, studies indicate that life satisfaction reports have an inclination to be 
influenced by many more intuitive factors such as moods caused by the 
weather (Haybron 2011, 11).  
The difference between life satisfaction theory and hedonism to which 
Bjørnskov implicitly bore witness is claimed to be that, whereas the hedonic 
approach measures “affects”, life satisfaction measures cognitive evaluations 
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of life. On the basis of objections such as those raised above, this very 
distinction, which is crucial in Bjørnskov’s book, has been questioned (Haybron 
2011, 31; Crisp 2008, 15). Are people simply not giving an affective expression 
of how they feel about their lives this morning? Apart from being a 
methodological problem, it also questions the importance of life satisfaction if 
people cannot even provide a proper evaluation of it (ibid., 11).  
Although Bjørnskov does not bring up these objections, he seems to have 
counter-arguments against them. He argues that the respondents’ free 
understanding and approach to what constitutes their satisfaction is a factor in 
favor of happiness research. He says that the benefit of such open questions is 
that they allow the respondent to judge according to what he or she regards as 
satisfying in her life instead of imposing the view of the researcher (Bjørnskov 
2014, 17).  His argument could also be reframed in the following way: if, in one 
context, the subject desires to have children in order to be content with her life 
but, in another, it is to be wealthy, then instead of choosing which desire is the 
best and correct one, happiness research allows the individual to judge 
according to his/her own standards. This is preferable in terms of scientific 
ideals because it minimizes the intervention of the researcher (cf. above).  
There are two problems with this argument. First of all, it cannot ensure that, 
although the respondent is free to evaluate her life according to his/her own 
standards, he or she will actually have such a fixed set of standards at all. This 
was exactly what the above objection disputed. The objection was not 
concerned with whether respondents responded according to some norm of the 
researcher but, rather, whether the respondent even has a fixed set of relevant 
standards at hand and, if so, whether he or she will respond according to them 
or some other intuition.  
The second problem with the counter-argument, following from the first, is that 
it cannot defend the strict distinction between short-term affects and long-term 
cognitive evaluations. If the respondent can respond freely according to some 
other intuition, then the survey runs the danger of measuring what Bjørnskov 
called “short-term happiness”, which thereby contradicts Bjørnskov’s claim 
that happiness research is a study of “long-term happiness”. To sum up the 
objection, a reader of this book should be aware of the difference between what 
its author claims in theory to be the (ideal) case about happiness measurements 
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and what it actually measures in practice. Bjørnskov definitely needs to 
respond to this inconsistency.  
(2) Be that as it may, the debates over the methodological issues in happiness 
research are ongoing and too recent to pass a final judgment on. If (and I repeat 
if) we accept that the life satisfaction approach to happiness research does 
measure what it claims to do, then we might move over to the other premise in 
Bjørnskov’s possible counter-argument, namely, that life satisfaction theory is 
the best possible option in terms of scientific integrity. This necessitates a 
comparison with rival theories. Since I have already indicated the advantages 
of life satisfaction over that of hedonism with which I basically agree, I shall, 
instead, turn to a third option, which has received less attention in happiness 
research, namely, the so-called eudaimonic theory of happiness.  
The eudaimonic approach defines happiness as the state of “using and 
developing the best in oneself, in accordance with one’s true self and one’s 
deeper principles” (Huta 2013, 201). Unlike life satisfaction (and hedonism), 
this theory highlights virtue over comfort. Although it is a position that has 
been defended since the ancient Greeks (and in multiple religious traditions), 
it has only recently begun to be integrated into empirical happiness research. 
The most successful account hitherto is the “psychological well-being scale” 
devised by Ryff and Keyes in 1995. This questionnaire for measuring happiness 
is much more complex than the ones used by life satisfaction theorists and 
includes components on personal growth, purpose in life, autonomy, 
environmental mastery, positive relations with others, and self-acceptance 
(Ryff & Keyes 1995, appendix). In particular, the scale has achieved empirical 
reliability by being correlated to variables such as lower mental illness, 
successful aging and physical health, and it has been associated with a left 
frontal brain activation (Huta 2013, 204), which, as Bjørnskov also recognizes, 
is the current biological definition of happiness (Bjørnskov 2014, 12).                     
At the outset, I wish to argue that, philosophically speaking, the psychological 
well-being scale is better equipped to accommodate the objections made above 
against life satisfaction because it is grounded in aspects of life that are more 
reliable and less prone to delusion, namely, inner personality traits. This is so 
because, by focusing on inner personality traits, the psychological well-being 
scale becomes less dependent on outer material circumstances of life. 
Consequently, the problem of limited information about those circumstances 
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becomes less of a problem. Moreover, a person who scores high on this scale, 
for instance, would (hypothetically speaking) be less affected if she found out 
that her husband was a contract killer because her happiness is grounded in 
inner personality traits. Of course, her inner personality traits could be 
grounded in the material conditions of her life, but this would still be a better 
option than the life satisfaction approach. Moreover, there are some inner traits 
that ensure that the subject is directly equipped to face radical life changes. The 
personal growth component, for instance, which establishes that the subject 
values constant self-discovery (Ryff & Keyes 1995, appendix), ensures that the 
subject is ready for the disclosure of unknown circumstances in her life.   
Nevertheless, if the position is firmer than that of life satisfaction from a 
philosophical point of view, it might not be so from the stance of empirical 
science. And this, in the end, is the point of view from which happiness 
research wants us to evaluate things. From this point of view, the eudaimonic 
approach can be criticized for being too speculative and value-laden to count 
as a scientific theory. This is due to the difficulty in finding empirical 
verification that its multitude of components really constitute happiness. The 
correlation with left frontal brain activity is a good attempt, but the same thing 
has been demonstrated in relationship to life satisfaction (Bjørnskov 2014, 12). 
And the correlations with mental and physical health beg the question of how 
to verify the qualification of these variables as happiness.   
This is not to say that life satisfaction scales are completely intuitively 
compelling accounts of happiness – which, as we have seen, they are not, but 
the point is only that it is more intuitively plausible than the eudaimonic 
account. To demonstrate the difference, the best example of how value-laden 
the scale of psychological well-being can be is, perhaps, the “positive 
relationship with others” component. This component says that the subject 
cares about the welfare of others (Ryff & Keyes 1995, appendix). This, however, 
is by no means an intuitive understanding of happiness (at least, not compared 
to life satisfaction) and implies a large moral intervention on the definition of 
happiness by the researcher’s own convictions.    
It is actually exactly due to this critique that the eudaimonic approach has 
experienced such poor reception in happiness research (Huta 2013, 208). Life 
satisfaction simply seems like a more value-neutral definition than 
eudaimonia. And, as Bjørnskov says (Bjørnskov 2014, 17), the strength of 
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happiness research has to be its value-neutrality in terms of understanding 
happiness. Although it is conventional, there is a serious problem with this line 
of reasoning if we take into consideration the critique of life satisfaction theory 
from earlier. If we agree that life satisfaction is highly exposed to the problem 
of misinformed, illusionary, inauthentic happiness, then it might be wise to 
sacrifice the empirical verification advantage in favor of a eudaimonic 
approach. The psychological well-being scale did, after all, manage to meet 
these objections.  
But one does not have to eliminate the life satisfaction theory entirely in favor 
of a eudaimonic account to accommodate the objections made in this paper. 
Although it has not been attempted, to my knowledge, a less radical revision 
of Bjørnskov’s account would be to incorporate some of the principles of 
eudaimonia into a firmer life satisfaction theory. For instance, one of the lessons 
learned by the eudaimonic account is that life satisfaction based on inner 
qualities rather than outer material conditions is less prone to delusion and, 
therefore, a more valuable indicator of happiness. So, all one would have to do 
is to construct a life satisfaction scale that takes this into account. This, I believe, 
designates a realistic future direction for happiness research in the light of my 
inquiry but surpasses, of course, the intention of this paper. For now, it suffices 
to say that, if money brings about more life satisfaction, as Bjørnskov claims it 
does (ibid., 23), then that type of life satisfaction is a very dangerous type of 
happiness.  
Conclusion 
What ought any reader of Tænkepauser’s pocketbook on happiness be aware of? 
A number of theoretical problems with its definition of happiness have been 
proposed. I believe they can be summed up in three main points: 
First of all and most generally, Bjørnskov understands happiness as a subjective 
experience of being satisfied with one’s life as a whole. This means that his 
approach takes into consideration neither whether one’s happiness is morally 
justifiable nor whether it is misinformed and deluded. Second, it is not even 
sure whether happiness research, in practice, is actually measuring what it 
claims, namely, life satisfaction. Much research, including empirical studies, 
questions the very possibility of measuring life satisfaction. Rather, what many 
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respondents, in reality, appear to be expressing is an intuitive short-term mood 
affected by such trivial factors as the weather.   
Finally, if we agree that happiness research is actually measuring that to which 
it alludes, then it might not even be the best possible option for measuring 
happiness empirically. I have tried to show how Bjørnskov’s theory could 
accommodate some of its problems by being revised and incorporating 
principles found in the eudaimonic approach to happiness. However, despite 
my directions for revision, it is doubtful whether happiness measurements can 
become worthy of the name. Although I have argued that there are good reasons 
for pursuing an empirical study of well-being or, more precisely, life 
satisfaction, we ought nevertheless to take into consideration whether it is 
possible to study happiness empirically in any philosophically adequate way 
at all. Happiness simply cannot be studied in the same way as material objects.  
In any case, from now on whenever we hear that it is scientifically proven that 
this or that country is the happiest in the world, it should immediately sound 
alarm bells for us. Awakening this alarm has been the task of philosophy ever 
since it was conceived. Of course, it appeals to our intellectual pride (and our 
wallet) to be able to say that we can measure happiness empirically just as it is 
nice to say that we know exactly when and how the Earth was conceived, but 
it has always been the task of the philosophical mind to love truth more than 
pride (and money) and confess openly that all we know is that we do not know 
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